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The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sessions v. Morales-Santana has
refueled a classic debate about constitutional remedies in equal protection
cases. 1 How should courts respond to underinclusive legislation? Nondiscrimination clauses are seldom clear about how equality is to be
accomplished. The most obvious remedy, one that is generally preferred
by plaintiffs, is that the benefits reserved for the advantaged group are
extended to those who were disadvantaged. However, equal protection
law would equally be satisfied if both groups are denied the benefit.
Levelling down may be considered “the mean remedy,” but it is usually
considered a remedy. After all, the plaintiff would get equal treatment. 2
* Dr. J. (Jerfi) Uzman is an Assistant Professor at Leiden University Law School in the Netherlands.
I am grateful to Professor Tracy Thomas for the invitation to present this paper at the 2017 virtual
conference on The Constitution and Remedies, and to the participants for their invaluable input. More
advice is always appreciated: j.uzman@law.leidenuniv.nl.
1. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Remedy in Morales-Santana (Again), BALKINIZATION BLOG
(June 13, 2017) https://balkin.blogspot.nl/2017/06/the-remedy-in-morales-santana-again.html
[https://perma.cc/4NP7-9JL9]; Mike Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude,
DORF ON LAW BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/equal-protection-andleveling-down-as.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc/MM9K-ALL2]; Tracy Thomas, SCOTUS Denial of
Equal Protection sRemedy Jeopardizes Equality Law: What was Justice Ginsburg Thinking?,
GENDER AND THE LAW PROF BLOG (June 13, 2017) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
gender_law/2017/06/sctous-denial-of-equal-protection-remedy-jeopardizes-equality-law-what-wasjustice-ginsburg-thinking.html [https://perma.cc/2HJA-X9H2]; The Judgment in Morales-Santana
(SCOTUS Symposium), PRAWSBLAWG (June 13, 2017) http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-judgment-in-morales-santana-scotus-symposium.html
[https://perma.cc/T65F-XTJX] (online symposium).
2. Michael Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude, DORF ON LAW
BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/equal-protection-and-leveling-downas.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc/MM9K-ALL2]; Ian Smith, Morales-Santana and the “Mean Remedy”,
TAKECAREBLOG (June 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/morales-santana-and-the-meanremedy [https://perma.cc/NHU2-4VVM].
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Yet this is problematic. Not only for the plaintiff, but also for the courts.
Recognizing that there are multiple options, raises the question of how to
justify the choice between them. If the Constitution is silent, what
“judicially manageable standards” are there to guide the remedial
calculus? Much has been written about that question, but the need for
clarity has remained. 3 Still, there is one consolation: American judges are
not alone. Throughout the western world, courts struggle with this issue.
Judges in many legal systems have increasingly been engaged in a rights
revolution, and equal treatment norms have been central to that
enterprise. 4 In doing so, they are frequently confronted with similar
dilemmas as raised in Morales-Santana. 5 What is striking however, is that
there is very little comparative literature on the ways in which courts deal
with this dilemma. 6
This contribution seeks to remedy this omission. It does not attempt
to contribute to the American debate about Sessions v. Morales-Santana.
U.S. scholars do not need the Dutch to explain or ridicule their own cases.7
Instead I aim to broaden the debate by putting Morales-Santana in a
comparative perspective. I discuss alternative judicial approaches to
underinclusive legislation, and I briefly assess those approaches
normatively, using the right to a remedy as a modest touchstone. My
argument will be that there is, at present, no single “best” approach, and
that a flexible approach based on proportionality and balancing is
warranted.

3. See, e.g., Bruce K. Miller, Constitutional Remedies For Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical
Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARVARD CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 79 (1985);
Bruce K. Miller & Neal Devins, Constitutional Rights Without Remedies: Judicial Review of
Underinclusive Legislation, 70 JUDICATURE 151 (1986); Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial
Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185 (1985); David M. Bizar, Remedying
Underinclusive Entitlement Statutes: Lessons from a Contrast of the Canadian and U.S. Doctrines,
24 U. MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 121 (1992).
4. A. von Bogdandy, The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for
Responding to the Challenges facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe, 7 INT’L L.J. CON LAW
364 (2009); Janneke H. Gerards, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EQUAL TREATMENT CASES (2005).
5. See H. Maurer, Zur Verfassungswidrigerklärung von Gesetzen, IM DIENST AN RECHT UND
STAAT 345-368 (H. Schneider & V. Gotz eds., 1974); Jörn Ipsen, RECHTSFOLGEN DER
VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGKEIT VON NORM UND EINZELAKT 190 (1980) (German context); Gerards, supra
note 4 (Dutch Context); Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies as “Constitutional
Hints – A Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1 (1991) (Canadian Context).
6. Bizar, supra note 3 (A notable exception is the work of Bizar).
7. Indeed, for an in-depth critique of Sessions v. Santana-Morales, see Tracy Thomas, Level
Down Gender Equality (April 25, 2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157987).

2018]

UPSTAIRS DOWNSTAIRS

141

I. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
In this section, I discuss the different ways in which courts in several
jurisdictions have approached the remedial question when confronted
with underinclusive legislation. What follows is not a systematic
comparative account. The case law of the U.S. Supreme Court is set
against some alternative paths taken by courts in other jurisdictions. These
include western liberal democracies that are roughly comparable to the
United States, in terms of shared constitutional values, such as the
separation of powers, human rights protection, and effective judicial
review. The judicial role in these jurisdictions may vary somewhat across
the spectrum of strong-form and weak-form review. 8 However, courts in
all the jurisdictions included are empowered to set aside legislation if it
violates norms of either constitutional or public international law.9 I
distinguish four approaches: the second-guessing approach (which is
regularly taken by U.S. courts) and three alternative paths: the rightsbased approach, the separation of powers approach, and the dialogical
model.
A.

The Second-Guessing Approach

Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana
is fairly illustrative of the standard American remedial approach to
underinclusive legislation, which is based on legislative intent. 10 The
starting point of this approach is a threefold assumption. First, that equal
treatment norms as such do not dictate a choice for either extending or
nullifying the benefit. 11 Second, that the choice between extending or
eliminating the benefit belongs to the courts and is not just a matter of
policy (as we will see, this latter assumption is not universally shared).
8. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1225 (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., 2006).
9. See GW. [Constitution] art. 120, 94 (Dutch courts are enjoined from constitutional review
of statutes, but they are empowered to strong-form review based on international (human rights) law);
See Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, The Dutch Supreme Court: A
Reluctant Positive Legislator, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS 645 (Alan
Brewer-Carias ed., 2011).
10. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U. S. 320, 330 (2006) (“the
touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent”).
11. Although generally true, there are important exceptions. If the standard of future treatment
for the advantaged class is unalterably fixed, judicial choice is limited to extending the benefit to the
disadvantaged class. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); United States v. Wiltberger,
18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (Furthermore, judicial expansion of criminal offences runs counter to nulla
poena sine lege; See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972) (When a law discriminates
by exempting certain groups from an offence, courts must extend the exemption.)
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And third, that the option of nullification can ultimately be considered an
appropriate remedy, be it perhaps not a nice one.12
These assumptions originate from a concurring opinion of Justice
Harlan in Welsh v. United States, in which he argued that:
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two
remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who
are aggrieved by exclusion. 13

Harlan also laid the ground work for the idea that the choice between those
two options was determined by legislative intent saying, “the boundaries
of permissible choice may properly be considered fixed by the legislative
pronouncement on severability.” 14 The Supreme Court seemingly adopted
this approach nine years later in Califano v. Westcott, when it considered
a severability clause decisive justification for extending a financial aid
program. 15 However, in this case, such an extension was uncontroversial.
In 1984, the Court more clearly confirmed the importance of
Congressional intent. It reiterated that the court should not “use its
remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.” 16 Perhaps
more importantly, the Supreme Court made it clear that it is within the
judicial competence to choose either of the two remedial paths: levellingup or down. Although extension is the preferred option, the Court stressed
that it considers it an adequate judicial remedy to withdraw benefits from
the favored class. 17
This approach, focusing on legislative intent, is not uncontroversial.
It raises the question of whose legislative intent should be considered
decisive: the legislature enacting the statute or the current legislature?18
The conventional view assumes the former: courts should focus on
Congress at the time when it passed the law. Otherwise one could hardly
12. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 566 -567 (1974); Heckler v. Mathews, 465
U.S. 728, 739 (1984) (fn. 8), quoting Justice Brandeis in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett,
284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931).
13. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 362 (1970).
14. Id. at 364.
15. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1979).
16. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (fn. 5) (quoting Justice Powell’s concurrence in
Califano v. Westcott).
17. Id. at 740 (fn. 8).
18. This question apparently sparked some discussion among the current members of the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-1191, p. 45-48, Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 582 U.S. __ (2017) (transcript of the discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Bader Ginsburg and Breyer during oral argument).

2018]

UPSTAIRS DOWNSTAIRS

143

maintain that the courts are implementing congressional intent. 19 The
basis for this approach, thus seems to be rooted in a specific understanding
of the rule of law, in which the courts implement legislative will to the
extent that it is constitutional. One problem is that there usually is no way
of establishing for certain what Congress would have wanted, had it been
aware of any constitutional defect. This decision always involves a
(varying) degree of second-guessing. Absent fallback or severability
clauses, the Supreme Court usually employs presumptions to determine
legislative intent. 20 They serve to identify the policy objectives behind the
legislative scheme. Thus, the relative size of both groups, the
consequences of extension for the budget, or the fact that extending would
lead to discrimination of a third group, may be relevant factors to
consider. 21 Still, these presumptions can only provide circumstantial
evidence at best. 22
A second problem, is that what Congress wanted the odd 40 years
ago is frequently rooted in a specific historical understanding of society,
which was at the heart of the unconstitutionality. It seems strained to
separate the legislative elements that are nowadays considered to be
discriminatory, from other elements of a given regulatory scheme. If, in
1950, Congress would allow women, but not men, in the military to take
six years of paid leave for taking care of young children, then such a
scheme is embedded in a very specific understanding of the role of
motherhood, the relationship between women and the military, and the
desirability of promoting traditional family values. To ask what Congress
would have wanted had it been aware that such a difference between men
and women was unconstitutional would, in a sense, constitute an
invitation to rewrite history. It would thus make sense to search for
alternative remedial paths.
B.

The Rights-Based Approach

In stark contrast to the second-guessing approach, stands what we
might call the rights-based approach of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (ECJ). 23 The ECJ is of course in a very different

19. Id. at p. 47, Roberts C.J.
20. Caminker, supra note 3, at 1189.
21. Id. at 1189, 1208.
22. Id. at 1188-1189.
23. This rights-based approach shares some similarities with but should be distinguished from
the norm-based model as was advocated by Evan Caminker (Caminker, supra note 3).
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constitutional position as compared to the United States Supreme Court. 24
First of all, it is not (yet) considered the highest court of a (federal) nation
state, although the EU has some federal features. 25 Nor is it in any formal
kind of hierarchical position vis-à-vis member state courts. Unlike the
U.S. Supreme Court, it has no appellate jurisdiction over state courts. 26
But again, the difference between the two courts should not be overstated.
In practice, the ECJ has considerable power over national courts of the
member states when it comes to applying EU law. 27 It essentially performs
two functions: it acts both as a supreme administrative and constitutional
court for the Union itself, and as the guardian of the uniform application
of EU Law by national courts. In short, there are thus two ways for the
ECJ to get involved in reviewing legislation against equal protection law.
First, it may itself review, and subsequently nullify, EU legislation for
failing to comply with the EU Treaties (including the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights). Moreover, it supervises national courts when they
apply EU Law. 28 This implies that the ECJ’s oversees, not only whether
national courts apply EU Law correctly, but also whether they provide
sufficient effective legal protection as required by Union law. When
national legislation violates European equal treatment law, the question of
how courts should proceed from a remedial perspective is thus, in theory,
a shared responsibility of both the highest domestic courts and the ECJ.
In practice however, the ECJ has strengthened its role by framing the
remedial issue as a matter of supremacy of the EU-Treaties, which,
according to its settled case law, take precedence over any kind of
domestic law including national constitutions. 29 The remedial question is,
in short, largely answered by the ECJ.
So, what does the “European” approach of the ECJ look like? Very
different, to be sure. The European Court effectively denies one of the
fundamental assumptions underpinning the second-guessing approach,
namely the fact that the courts actually have a choice. By contrast, the ECJ
24. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L. J. CON. LAW 618 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Stefan Oeter, Federalism and Democracy, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55, 56 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2009).
26. See, e.g., Jan Komárek, Precedent and Judicial Lawmaking in Supreme Courts: The Court
of Justice Compared to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de Cassation, 11 CAMBRIDGE
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 399, 409 (2009).
27. See Jan Komárek, Federal elements in the community judicial system: building coherence
in the community legal order, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REV. 9 (2005).
28. See e.g. Rob van Gestel & Jurgen de Poorter, Supreme administrative courts’ preliminary
questions to the CJEU: start of a dialogue or talking to deaf ears?, 6 CAMBRIDGE INT. LAW JOURNAL
122 (2017).
29. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
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consistently rules that victims of underinclusive legislation must be
treated in the same way and made subject to the same arrangements as the
advantaged class, because in the eyes of the ECJ, these arrangements form
the only valid point of reference. 30 The Court recognizes, of course, that
the legislature remains free to choose a different path to achieve equal
treatment, but as long as legislators have not done so, the courts have no
other option than to extend the existing benefits. 31
The ECJ has never clarified why it considers extending the only
option. That is problematic, but not surprising given the ECJ’s frugal
argumentative style as compared to U.S. judicial reasoning. 32 One
explanation might be that these judgments are pronounced in the context
of the ECJ’s task of supervising domestic courts. It may be that the Court
uses the strict obligation to level-up as a strategic tool to force member
states to faithfully comply with EU (equal treatment) law. Such an
incentive may sometimes be called for due to the tendency of some
domestic courts to treat EU law as a foreign body of law. The level-up
remedy then serves as quasi punitive damages. 33 Basically, what the ECJ
might say is: “if you mess up, we are not going to save you.”
There may be some truth in such a strategic explanation. However,
one would then expect the ECJ to take a different view when it reviews
Union law for compliance with the EU-Treaties. After all, there are no
domestic courts involved in such an exercise, just Community institutions.
And indeed, the early case law of the Court displays a cautious attitude
towards the EU legislature. In 1977, it declared a regulation which
provided a fiscal refund scheme for some products made from maize, but
not for others to violate the constitutional principle of equality. 34
However, the Court refrained from invalidating the refund scheme, nor
30. See, e.g., Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen
buitenland, 1999 E.C.R. I-345, at 57 (domestic courts should extend tax scheme to both residents and
non-residents). The roots of this approach originate from: The Netherlands v. Federatie Nederlandse
Vakbeweging, 1986 E.C.R. 3855, at 22 (women should enjoy same unemployment benefits as men).
See also Specht v. City of Berlin, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2005, at 93-95 (difference of treatment in
civil servants pay is unjustified, but may continue for a while for lack of clear framework of
reference); Milkova v. Director of Privatization, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:198, at 66-67 (domestic
courts should extend scheme for employees with disabilities to civil servants with disabilities).
31. Michael Dougan, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE: ISSUES OF
HARMONISATION AND DIFFERENTIATION 20 (Hart Publishing 2004).
32. See, e.g., Mitchel Lasser, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (Oxford University Press 2009); Komárek, supra note 26, at 409.
33. J.H. Jans, S. Prechal & R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC LAW 184
(GroningenL Europa Law Publishing, 2nd ed. 2015).
34. Ruckdeschel & Co v. Customs Office Hamburg-St. Annen, 1977 E.C.R. 1753. See also
Société des Fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community, 1959 E.C.R. 215.
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did it extend it to disadvantaged manufacturers. Instead, it considered that
there were several courses of action that would lead to the elimination of
the inequality, and it was “for the institutions responsible for the common
agricultural policy to assess” the necessary choice of action.35 In the
meantime, the regulation, with its inequality, would remain in force. In
later years, however, the Court seems to have abandoned that approach. It
still insisted that it was up to the community legislature to adopt “such
measures as may be appropriate in order to establish equal treatment.” 36
However, pending the adoption of the new rules, “the competent
authorities must continue to apply the exemption provided for in the
provision declared invalid but they must also grant it to the operators
affected by the discrimination found to exist.” 37 It is this approach that has
survived over the years. Thus, in a landmark case about passenger rights
in aviation, the Court considered a difference in treatment in an EU
regulation between the rights of passengers whose flights was delayed, as
opposed to those whose flights were cancelled, arbitrary and thus a breach
of the principle of equality. This time it did not even make any reference
to the role of the European legislature. Instead, by way of interpretation,
it simply extended the rules for passengers of annulled flights to the group
of passengers whose flights were delayed for more than three hours.38 In
short, it seems irrelevant whether the inequality originates in the law of
the member states, or in EU law itself.
Rather than a strategic tool to influence domestic actors, it seems that
the Court simply regards extending to be the only legitimate way forward
for the courts. This view may, alternatively, be explained by the Court’s
repeated emphasis on two other principles that are considered
fundamental to EU law: legal certainty and effective legal protection. It
might be that the Court simply considers nullification of benefits for third
parties as contrary to the judicial function. Such a view has been defended
in the domestic constitutional law of some European member states. 39
However, this theory is neither uncontroversial nor widely followed. It
has been rejected on the grounds that such a rigid insistence on extending

35. Id. at 1772.
36. Van Landschoot v. Mera, 1988 E.C.R. 3456, at 3463 (no. 22).
37. Id. at 3465.
38. Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst, 2009 E.C.R. I-10923.
39. See, e.g., Pieter van Dijk, De houding van de Hoge Raad jegens de verdragen inzake de
rechten van de mens, DE PLAATS VAN DE HOGE RAAD IN HET HUIDIGE STAATSBESTEL 173-209
(Zwolle, B. Baardman ed. 1988) (arguing, unfortunately in Dutch, that only legislatures are
empowered to withdraw existing rights from persons that are not party to the litigation).
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is highly unworkable in practice. 40 And yet, the principled view that
recognizing multiple acceptable policy outcomes, does not imply a
judicial choice between those outcomes, remains somewhat attractive.
C.

The Separation of Powers Approach

Courts applying the separation of powers approach follow a similar
reasoning to the U.S Supreme Court. They assume that equal treatment
does not dictate a specific policy outcome. Moreover, like SCOTUS, they
consider levelling down, be it reluctantly, to be an adequate judicial
remedy. However, these courts consider the choice between levelling-up
or down a political decision that should be left to the legislature. They stay
well out of the way of political decision making, and thus refuse to provide
any remedy at all other than declaratory relief. One finds this approach in
the Netherlands, but also by some members of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Indeed, it seems to be advocated by Justices Thomas and Alito in Sessions
v. Morales-Santana. 41
The classic example is a judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court in
the 1980’s, ironically also about a discriminatory scheme for acquiring
citizenship. In those days, the law on Dutch citizenship granted foreign
women married to a Dutch (male) citizen the right to acquire Dutch
nationality by a simple formal declaration. However, the same kind of
generosity was not bestowed upon foreign husbands of female citizens. 42
When this law was challenged on grounds of non-discrimination, the
Dutch Supreme Court declined to review it. 43 It considered that to
abrogate the right for women was just as lawful as extending the right to
men, and to choose between the two options would be to encroach upon
the political prerogative of Parliament. Thus, because the court would be
unable to provide redress, it saw no reason to proceed any further. And
so, the Court left open the question whether the statutory provision
violated a non-discrimination clause and it turned down the plaintiffs
claim.
40. S.K. Martens, De grenzen van de rechtsvormende taak van de rechter, 75 NEDERLANDS
JURISTENBLAD 2000, 747 (2012).
41. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. It may be interesting to note, although hardly relevant for our present inquiry, that this was
a very deliberate legislative choice. Both the government and Parliament expressly considered women
with foreign husbands ‘irrational’, ‘not morally impeccable’ and possible victims of ‘foreign fortune
hunters’. For those who read Dutch, see Betty de Hart, ‘ONBEZONNEN VROUWEN’: GEMENGDE
RELATIES IN HET NATIONALITEITSRECHT EN HET VREEMDELINGENRECHT (“‘IRRATIONAL WOMEN’:
MIXED RELATIONSHIPS IN IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW’) 218 (Amsterdam 2003).
43. SCN judgment of 12 Oct. 1984, NJ 1985/230, ECLI:NL:HR:1984:AG4874 (Citizenship
Case).
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The Court was widely criticized for its Citizenship Judgment, both
for its refusal to review the merits of the case and the lack of a remedy. 44
In 1998, it responded to its critics in a landmark judgment about an
underinclusive tax exemption. 45 This time, the Court expressly considered
that the impugned law violated international equal treatment law. It then
examined whether it could provide relief, stressing that this question
warranted a careful balancing of two principles: effective legal protection
and the need for judicial restraint. The result, the Court concluded, was
that it would provide relief unless that would involve policy making or
political choices. If that were the case, the courts should leave the matter
for Parliament, at least for the time being. 46 This last remark is important:
it shows that the Court does consider the judiciary ultimately empowered
to decide the remedial issue when Parliament knowingly leaves the
violation intact. Rather, its restraint is of a relative nature: it is a matter of
judicial policy, rather than of competence. However, although the Dutch
legislature has often been slow to respond, the Court has never actually
intervened. Moreover, the Court does not require the legislature to deal
with past violations or attach retroactive effect to its amendments. 47
Needless to say, this may have serious consequences for the victims of
ongoing unequal treatment.
The fact that the Dutch courts consider their approach as one of
restraint, rather than of competence, stands in stark contrast to the
somewhat comparable approach advocated by Justices Scalia and
Thomas. In Miller v. Albright, Justice Scalia argued, along the same lines
as the reasoning of the Dutch Court, “that the complaint should be
dismissed because the courts had no power to provide the relief
requested.” 48 He went on to add that, “It is in my view incompatible with
the plenary power of Congress . . . for judges to speculate as to what
Congress would have enacted if it had not enacted what it did.” 49 This
comes very close to the approach taken by the Dutch Supreme Court in its
Citizenship Case of 1984: because the courts should not second-guess

44. Erika de Wet, The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium, A EUROPE OF
RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 229, 241 (H. Keller & A. Stone
Sweet eds., Oxford University Press 2008).
45. SCN judgment of 12 May 1999, NJ 2000/170 (Labour expenses deduction).
46. Id. para. 3.15.
47. E.g., SCN judgment of 14 June 2002, BNB 2002/289, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:ZC8146
(Labour deduction II).
48. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 422 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 457.
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legislative intent, it is inappropriate to reach the merits of the case. 50 Both
approaches clearly appeal to separation of powers concerns. Moreover,
they both hint vaguely at some political question doctrine, be it in different
ways. Justice Scalia seems to suggest that immigration and citizenship are
fields that are constitutionally reserved for a coordinate branch. 51 The
Dutch Supreme Court, on the other hand, is more concerned with a lack
of judicially discoverable standards to choose between levelling-up or
down. 52 Moreover, as I remarked before, where Justice Scalia framed the
matter as one of competence, the Dutch Supreme Court was careful to
emphasize that its restraint was a matter of constitutional courtesy. This
difference seems perhaps somewhat formalistic, but it is significant.
D.

The Dialogic Approach

There has been a fair amount of talk about constitutional dialogue
lately. The modern use of the metaphor, which originates from Canadian
constitutional law, continues to dominate the debate on constitutionalism
and judicial review. 53 The concept has many dimensions, one of which is
the notion of remedial dialogue: the idea that the shaping of judicial
remedies may contribute to a meaningful dialogue between courts and
legislature. 54 Using the temporal effects of their judgments, courts may
allow legislatures time to remedy defective legislation. This should
achieve a unique balance between the competing ideals of effective rights
protection and democratic self-determination. Leaving aside the matter of
whether that is actually realistic, I discuss two examples of remedial
dialogue in the context of underinclusiveness, drawn from two very
different courts: the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany (the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or
BVerfG).

50. SCN judgment of 12 Oct. 1984, NJ 1985/230, ECLI:NL:HR:1984:AG4874 (Citizenship
Case).
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
52. Id. at 226.
53. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures (or perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a bad Thing after All), 35 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 75 (1997); Kent Roach, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC
DIALOGUE (Toronto 2001).
54. The work of Kent Roach is of fundamental in this respect: See, e.g., Remedial Consensus
and Dialogue under the Charter: General Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity, 35
U.B.C. L. REV. 211 (2001); Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues
About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEXAS INT. L.J. 537 (2005).
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i. The Supreme Court of Canada
When confronted with underinclusive legislation, Canadian courts
traditionally focus on legislative intent.55 In the 1992 landmark case of
Schachter v. Canada, then Chief Justice Antonio Lamer listed five
remedial options while recognizing that “a court has flexibility in
determining what course of action to take following a violation of the
Charter [of Rights and Freedoms, JU].” 56 Guidance could be drawn from
the hypothetical preferences of the legislature. To that end, the judgment
extensively discussed a range of factors that were indicative of legislative
preferences, such as budgetary considerations and the relative size of the
two groups involved. 57 However, in the case at hand (concerning a social
assistance scheme which distinguished between natural and adoptive
parents), the Court concluded that ascertaining the legislative objectives
was difficult. 58 Lamer C.J. stressed that the Court should be weary of
extending benefits under these circumstances. 59 Invalidation of the
scheme was the appropriate remedy. However, he also observed that
striking down would deprive eligible persons of a benefit without
providing any relief to the respondent. He solved that difficulty by turning
to a device he had developed seven years earlier in Re Manitoba Language
Rights. 60 In that case, the Court had suspended its declaration of invalidity
in order to give the legislature time to work out a solution. In Schachter,
Lamer C.J. argues at length that delayed declarations should be considered
exceptional, given that they allow a finding of unconstitutionality to
persist. Only when a declaration of invalidity threatens public safety or
the rule of law, may it be considered appropriate. 61 The Court then
conveniently added one other category: delayed declarations of invalidity
could also be appropriate when the law under review is underinclusive
and striking it down would result in the loss of rights by third parties.
The Court, in Schachter, stressed that “the question whether to delay
the application of a declaration of nullity should turn not on considerations
of the role of the courts and the legislature but rather on considerations
relating to the effect of an immediate declaration on the public.” 62 And
55.
(2016).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1991).
61.
62.

See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA LAW REV. 322, 340
Schachter v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 679, 695 (1992).
Id. at 709, 711.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
Re Manitoba Language Rights, 1 S.C.R. 721 (1985). See also R. v. Swain, 1 S.C.R. 933
Schachter, 2 S.C.R. at 715-716.
Id. at 717.
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yet, in later years, Canadian courts seem to have abandoned this approach
in practice, if not in theory. They rarely justify delaying their judgments
with reference to the costs of legal discontinuity, nor do they weigh those
costs against the costs of temporarily maintaining an unconstitutional state
of affairs. 63 It rather seems as if Canadian courts no longer regard
suspension as an emergency measure but rather as a standard dialogic
device to remand sensitive issues to the legislature for consideration. This
allows them to circumvent the difficult choice that U.S. courts face, but it
also protects them, at least to some extent, from many of the downsides
of the rights-based approach (which can have immense budgetary
implications) or the separation of powers approach (which falls short in
terms of effective legal protection).
ii. The German Constitutional Court
The innovative approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada has
been met with much enthusiasm in other parts of the world. Several courts
have carried out similar experiments. 64 But perhaps the most interesting
example in terms of comparison comes from a jurisdiction where remedial
delay has been around for more than 50 years, without actually calling it
dialogue. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (FCC) has always
maintained that unconstitutional laws are automatically void. 65 And yet
since 1961, it regularly turns a blind eye when confronted with
underinclusive legislation. In those cases, instead of declaring legislation
invalid,
it
declares
it
“merely
unconstitutional”
(“bloβ
66
verfassungswirdig”). Usually such a declaration is accompanied by
some kind of interim arrangement. This arrangement applies until the
legislature has replaced it with a scheme of its own. A mere declaration
of unconstitutionality does not affect the validity of the law, but it does
usually trigger a situation in which courts and agencies may no longer
apply it to existing and future cases. 67 Moreover, they should suspend
those existing cases until Parliament has replaced the unconstitutional

63. Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and
Legislative Constitutional Remedies, 21 SUPREME COURT LAW REV. 205, 232 (2003).
64. See e.g. the judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fourie, 1 S.A. 524 (2006) (Court grants Parliament a grace period in order to implement
same-sex marriage). See also: Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays,
91 TULANE L. REV. 259 (2016). (noting the strategic use of remedial delay in this case).
65. See e.g.: the Südweststaat (‘Southwest State’) judgment of the FCC, 1 BVerfG 14 (1951).
66. See BVerfGE 13, 248 (1961) (judgment of December 13, 1961).
67. BVerfGE 317, 217 (1974) (Desecendants nationality judgment).
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norm, at which time they should decide these cases under the new rule or,
if applicable, under any transitional scheme the legislature has devised.68
That is the general rule. However, the FCC sometimes, by way of
interim measure, proclaims that the unconstitutional norm continues to be
applicable, be it modified and only for a certain amount of time. 69 Thus,
in a case in which the legislature had discriminated between married
couples and registered partners for the purposes of a fiscal scheme, the
Court ordered the continued application of the scheme for married couples
in the interest of legal certainty. It ordered however, that by way of interim
measure, the courts were to temporarily extend the benefit to registered
partners. 70 Similarly, in a case somewhat comparable to Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, it considered it necessary, given the fundamental
importance of clarity about the status of nationality for children, to order
the continued application of a law that conferred German nationality to
descendants of German fathers, but not of German mothers. 71 However,
it added specific instructions, which essentially secured that all children
born before the entry into force of the new legislation would ultimately
secure German citizenship.
The German Constitutional Court is, compared to the Supreme Court
of Canada, far more vocal about the legislative duties following a
declaration of unconstitutionality, meticulously supervising the legislative
process. Parliament is under a legal obligation to change the law.72
Moreover, the FCC has explicitly ruled that the new rule should have
retroactive effect, at least to the date of the FCC’s original judgment. 73
The period before the FCC’s judgment is covered by a more flexible
regime: Parliament can, in some circumstances, be required to make some
kind of arrangement for the victims of the unconstitutionality, but this
need not necessarily amount to full reparation. 74 What the Court basically
does, is that it balances the need to provide redress to the victims of an
unconstitutionality with other legitimate interests, such as the rights of
third parties and the need for sound public finance. 75
All this is to secure legislative involvement in the remedial process,
while at the same time safeguarding, as much as possible, the rights of
both the litigants and those who are in a comparable position. Mere
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
The landmark judgment is: BVerfGE 119, 331 (Hartz IV).
BVerfGE 133, 377 (2013).
BVerfGE 317, 217 (1974).
BVerfGE at 217; BVerfGE 82, 126 (Notice period judgment).
BVerfGE 87, 114 (1992) (Allotments judgment).
Id; see also, BVerfGE 133, 377 (2013) (Married couples and registered partners judgment).
See e.g., BVerfGE 87, 153 (1992) (Basic subsistence minimum judgment).
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declarations nowadays constitute a very substantial percentage of the
FCC’s findings of unconstitutionality. However, this practice has
remained controversial. It has been criticized as too activist by those who
consider the judicial interim measures as too great an intrusion to the
legislative sphere. 76 Others, by contrast, complain that the Court does too
little to meet its judicial obligation to provide effective redress. 77 That last
question is particularly relevant for the topic of our present inquiry, and it
is to the principle of effective legal protection I now turn.
II. IUS UBI, IBI REMEDIUM AS AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
Having outlined four different approaches to the problem of
underinclusive legislation, the question presents itself: which one is best?
Unfortunately, this short essay is hardly the place to flesh out a normative
theory capable of evaluation. Its chief purpose was to broaden the debate
on Morales-Santana by bringing in a comparative perspective. However,
it would be very impolite to the reader not to offer some brief thoughts on
the normative aspect. In order to do this, we shall need some kind of
framework. Such a framework may be found in the principle of effective
legal protection, more commonly referred to by the Latin maxim Ubi Ius,
Ibi Remedium. 78 This principle is part of constitutional heritage in many
parts of the world. Widely considered a vital part of the rule of law, it is
included in many constitutions. 79 In the common law world it has long
been, “a settled and invariable principle . . . that every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” 80 So
much so, that it became an inextricable part of U.S. constitutional history

76. E.g. R. Lamprecht, Oligarchie in Karlsruhe: Über die Erosion der Gewaltenteilung
(‘Oligarchy in Karlsruhe: About the Erosion of the Separation of Powers’), 47 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 3272 (1994).
77. Michael Sachs, Bloβe Unvereinbarerklärung bei Gleichheitsverstöβen? Probleme einer
Entscheidungspraxis des BVerfG (‘Mere Declarations of Incompatibility for Violations of NonDiscrimination? Problems of a Remedial Practice of the FCC’), 1 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (NVWZ) 657 (1982); Michael Sachs, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT
(‘CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE’) 60 (Heidelberg 2004).
78. See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004). See also Tracy Thomas, Leveling Down
Equality, 9 CONLAWNOW [2018] [forthcoming], for a very similar approach from a domestic
perspective.
79. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 465 (Oxford
University Press 2005); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art 19.4; C.E., B.O.E. n. 53.2 (Spain);
Constitucíon Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, art. 103, Diario Oficial de la
Federacíon [DOF] 05-02-1917 (Mex.).
80. William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Oxford University
Press 1765).
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when Chief Justice Marshall quoted it in Marbury v. Madison. 81 Its
importance is highlighted, moreover, by the fact that it is considered a
core human right, featuring in several international conventions. 82
Ius ubi, ibi remedium is important, but it is also a highly complex
fundamental right. On its face, it gives the impression of absoluteness.
Most documents, either in constitutional or in public international law, fail
to include any limitation clause to the right to a remedy. Moreover, in
many cases, such as Marbury v. Madison, the principle is presented as an
unyielding imperative. However, as Fallon and Meltzer have rightly
stressed, this “apparent promise of effective redress for all constitutional
violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal is not
always attained.” 83 Or, as Dinah Shelton observed in the context of
international human rights law: “[t]he latin maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium . . . is not, and perhaps cannot be, strictly observed in practice.
Rights have gone unremedied in the past, and some will go unremedied in
the future.” 84 The law of constitutional remedies is, by definition
imperfect, the great promises of Blackstone, constitutions, and human
rights notwithstanding. Effective legal protection is, in other words, a
qualified right. This means that the principle allows itself to be balanced
against other principles, such as legal certainty, the separation of powers,
and democratic self-governance. But how should we reconcile this with
the principle’s unyielding aura?
The answer lies in, what one might call, a functional approach to
effective legal protection. Constitutional remedies basically perform two
legal functions. 85 On a microlevel they prescribe full reparation of
individual violations and measures to secure future norm compliance. On
a more structural level, they also serve to reinforce the rule of law. Both
constitutions and human rights instruments presuppose a functioning
institutional system that is designed to ensure that governments respect
constitutional values and generally act within the boundaries of the law.
As Fallon and Meltzer have rightly stressed: “Of the two functions
performed by constitutional remedies, providing effective remediation to
individual victims is the more familiar, but ensuring governmental
faithfulness to law is, if not the more fundamental, at least the more

81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
82. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2.3; European
Convention on Human Rights, art. 13; Inter-American Convention, art. 25.
83. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARVARD L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991).
84. Shelton, supra note 79, at 21.
85. I derive this account from Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 83, at 1787.
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unyielding.” 86 Distinguishing between these two sides of the coin may be
helpful to identify the interaction between the two. Although the
microlevel function allows for balancing, whereas at the macrolevel, the
principle is virtually absolute, the latter’s unyielding character does
influence this microlevel balancing exercise. In other words, the
consequences of a specific case for the protection of a given right at the
structural level may raise the weight of providing a remedy at the
microlevel.
Furthermore, the fundamental right to a remedy may also perform a
more socio-theoretical function in that it forces the main protectors of
rights, the courts, to rationally justify the outcome of this balancing
exercise. Human rights institute, what German scholar Mattias Kumm has
referred to as “a practice of Socratic contestation”: they require the
authorities to give sound reasons for their claims. 87 The way it works is
that courts, using proportionality as a framework of reference, critically
scrutinize legislative or executive claims underpinning the exercise of
power. Such “Socratic questioning” may reveal “a great deal of
thoughtlessness, platitudes, conventions, or brute power-mongering that
dresses up as wisdom, but falls together like a house of cards when pressed
for justifications.” 88 Usually this “rationalist human rights paradigm” is
enforced by the courts vis-à-vis governments and legislatures. 89 However,
there is no reason why it should not also be applied to the judicial function
itself. In the context of the duty to provide effective remedies, this means
that courts must justify their remedial choices with reference to concrete
and, as much as possible, evidence-based reasons. 90 The proportionality
test, as it is used—in one form or another—may serve as a useful tool to
guide this exercise. 91
What this all means for present purposes, is that we should first
recognize that ius ubi, ibi remedium does allow for certain exceptions.
However, these exceptions should be based upon a clear and specific
countervailing principle. It is, for instance, possible that providing a
86. Id. at 1789.
87. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point
of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (2010).
88. Id. at 153.
89. Mattias Kumm, Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights
Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review, 1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES 2 (2007),
90. Thomas, supra note 78, at 1643 (arguing for strict scrutiny when evaluating the denial of a
remedy).
91. See, e.g., Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But
Here?, 22 DUKE J. OF INT. & COMPARATIVE LAW 291 (outlining the general structure of the
proportionality principle).
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specific remedy would be inconsistent with legal certainty (in case of
withdrawing rights from third parties), or that striking down a
discriminatory exception to a criminal offense for the advantaged class is
prohibited by nulla poena sine lege. It is also possible that courts would
want to avoid a specific remedial outcome out of respect for the
legislature. These concerns are, however, far too abstract to justify
remedial restraint as such. We need to specify precisely what the
principles we identified dictate in a specific case. One might for instance,
in the case concerning underinclusive legislation, argue that remedial
restraint is based on a very specific substantive perception of the
separation of powers, which grounds the necessity for judicial restraint in
the idea of collective self-determination. 92 In other words: the notion of
collective self-determination dictates that courts should be wary of
crafting remedies that impede on the primacy of the political process.
However, that is only the first step of the analysis because then, the court
will need to specify exactly why this principle dictates restraint in the
specific context of the case at hand. Moreover, the exception to the right
to a remedy should be narrowly construed in light of the specifics of the
case at hand. There is no one size fits all outcome in constitutional
remedies.
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: SOME OBSERVATIONS
What does this all mean for the four approaches I identified before?
The answer is fairly simple when it comes to the separation of powers
approach taken by the Dutch courts. That approach, on the surface, seems
to include a balancing of two principles: effective legal protection and
judicial restraint. However, at closer sight, hardly any balancing takes
place at all. Instead, there is a bright-line rule dictating that in cases of
underinclusiveness, courts should leave the remedial matter for
Parliament to decide. Even if Parliament would eventually change the law,
it is unclear whether the original claimant would benefit of the new
scheme. Moreover, it would be very unlikely indeed that victims of past
violations would obtain redress. Such an approach thus immediately falls
short in terms of effective legal protection.
The American approach produces a more complicated picture.
Obviously, a decision to level-up would not be problematic in terms of
effective legal protection. With regard to the possibility of levellingdown, one might argue that such a course of action would constitute an
92.

See Christoph Möllers, THE THREE BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION
(Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2013).
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adequate, be it a “mean” remedy. Thus, Michael Dorf argues that although
the Court could not give Morales-Santana the relief he sought, it did
ultimately issue a constitutionally adequate remedy. 93 The reasoning
behind this is that the victims of underinclusive legislation do not rely on
a substantive constitutional value, they “just” want to be treated equally.
Levelling-down would accomplish that. However, this reasoning is
incomplete. It fails to recognize that the relevant point of reference is not
future applications of the law, but past applications. If a court intends to
remedy the situation levelling-down, it is required, not only to refuse the
benefit to future applicants of the advantaged class, in order to achieve
full equal treatment. It must also somehow “take back” what was already
given. That is something the courts are fundamentally unequipped to do.
Doctrines such as res iudicata and nulla poena sine lege would resist such
a course. Thus, levelling-down is problematic under the right to an
effective remedy.
The second question is whether levelling down may still be justified
because of the need to respect legislative intent. I hardly think it does.
First of all, applying the framework set out previously, it is unclear exactly
what justifies the second-guessing approach. Is it to enforce, as much as
possible, the legislative will of a former legislature? Or is it to preserve
the space for collective self-determination by the present legislature? And
how can levelling-down really be said to serve collective selfdetermination? Courts under the second-guessing approach tend to, well,
second-guess. Their reasons for choosing either this way or that can
seldom be evidence-based. Moreover, they need to rely on assumptions
that are highly difficult to substantiate. This means that the secondguessing approach may easily lead to arbitrariness. Last but not least,
focusing on legislative intent makes it difficult to balance the different
interests involved in the remedial calculus. What, for instance, if fear of
levelling-down would lead to a chilling effect on litigation? Should adults
think twice of arguing an age discrimination complaint in court
concerning a law that exempts juveniles from life imprisonment? 94 Or
should a court steer well away of even finding a violation because it would
otherwise have to take away the benefits of (vulnerable) third parties? 95
In other words, this is where the structural level of the right to a remedy

93.
94.
95.

Dorf, supra note 2.
Khamtokhu & Aksenchik v. Russia, no. 60367/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).
This is what eventually happened in Khamtokhu & Aksenchik.
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comes into play. 96 Such a perspective would dictate the courts involved to
extending rather than to invalidating.
Obviously, the rights-based approach is comparatively more
favorable from a remedial perspective. Still, it can be problematic in terms
of collective self-determination. Ironically, this approach suffers from the
same lack of balancing as the others. By prescribing levelling-up as the
only possible option, the ECJ runs the risk of overextending a relatively
minor legislative scheme. That could seriously jeopardize legitimate
government interests. Of course, such a course could still be justified, but
the rights-based approach has no way of filtering unnecessary cases out.
Again, the structural level of protecting constitutional rights is relevant
here. Because if levelling-up is the only possible remedy, courts might
well become excessively cautious when reviewing legislation. Of course,
legislatures can respond by enacting new legislation, but they have a
strong political incentive not to withdraw benefits. Moreover, such a “ping
pong” effect between courts and legislature can have disruptive effects in
terms of legal certainty.
Finally, how should the dialogic approach be evaluated? First of all,
the dialogic remedy does enjoy a few advantages over the other three
approaches. It avoids the problem of second-guessing by referring the
matter to the legislature, thus allowing room for collective selfdetermination. Democratic self-determination is also distinctly better off
under the dialogic model than under the rights-based approach because
the legislature may balance the different interests involved, instead of
having one automatic remedy bestowed upon it. Last but not least,
although the dialogic and the separation of power approach share their
aspiration of leaving the legislature room for maneuver, litigants under the
dialogic model are distinctly better off. Unlike under the separation of
powers approach, courts under the dialogical approach formulate a
remedy which takes effect at some later point in time. Moreover, both the
Supreme Court of Canada and the German FCC frequently (if not always)
retain jurisdiction so that they may continue to supervise legislative
deliberations. Both aspects greatly increase the chances of redress for the
original claimants.
And yet there remain some challenges for the dialogical model, the
most important of which is the fact that the remedial quest under the
dialogical model is in danger of being turned into a socio-political, rather
than a legal enterprise. Theories underpinning the idea of constitutional

96. See, Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies as “Constitutional Hints”: A
Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1 (1991) for a similar approach.
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dialogue usually focus on the structural level, rather than on the
consequences for individual litigants. There is much to be said for such an
approach. 97 However, viewing the outcome of a case in terms of general
policy, does come at a cost. It may result in the courts overlooking the
position of the individual litigant, whose interests should, after all, be at
the heart of the remedial calculus. Thus, the question surely must be what
happens if the legislature does change the law. Can the original claimant
benefit from such a change of law? Most constitutionalists talking
dialogue, seem to be little interested in that question. 98 It is highly
relevant, however, because legislatures have a tendency of solving the
matter prospectively only. This leaves it up to the courts to devise a
remedial structure which ensures that litigants are not forgotten in this
political game between the institutions. There is still much work to be
done in that respect. However, the approach taken by the German
Constitutional Court may provide us with some clues in this respect. It
provides the legislature with relatively clear guidance as to what is
required in terms of retrospectivity. Moreover, as we have seen, the court
has specifically outlined the duties of regular courts and executive
agencies with respect to the effects of its declaration of unconstitutionality
for ongoing cases, thus ensuring that litigants are not forgotten.
Developing such a framework is difficult to be sure, but necessary
nonetheless.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the world of constitutional remedies, the problem of
underinclusiveness may be described as the ultimate litmus test. It puts
courts before complex and interconnected constitutional issues. The
United States Supreme Court has tried to close Pandora’s box by invoking
legislative intent. Comparative analysis shows, however, that legislative
intent is neither a necessary nor even a convenient basis for remedial
policy. A more flexible approach that builds upon proportionality and
dialogue would enable courts to reconcile the fundamental right to a
remedy with collective self-determination. Our efforts should be directed
towards refining such an approach. That is the challenge for the years to
come.

97. See, e.g., Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in
Constitutional Remedies, 33 ARIZONA L. REV. 559 (1991) (stressing the need to address constitutional
defects on a more structural level).
98. But see Choudhry & Roach, supra note 55; Aruna Sathanapally, BEYOND DISAGREEMENT:
OPEN REMEDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2012).

